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Amos Pinchot was born in 1863. The son of a wealthy businessman, Pinchot studied law in New York City. In 1900 he married Gertrude Minturn. The couple had two children, Rosamund and Gifford. Pinchot held left-wing views and in 1911 helped establish the radical journal The Masses.
In 1912 Pinchot helped formed the Progressive Party. Later that year Theodore Roosevelt and Hiram Johnson became the party's candidates for the presidential election. The proposed program included women's suffrage, direct election of senators, anti-trust legislation and the prohibition of child labour. In winning 4,126,020 votes Roosevelt defeated William H. Taft, the official candidate of the Republican Party. However, he received less votes than the Democratic Party candidate, Woodrow Wilson.
Pinchot believed that the First World War had been caused by the imperialist competitive system. This was the point of view expressed by The Masses. In July, 1917, it was claimed by the authorities that articles by Floyd Dell and Max Eastman and cartoons by Art Young, Boardman Robinson and H. J. Glintenkamp had violated the Espionage Act. Under this act it was an offence to publish material that undermined the war effort. The legal action that followed forced the journal to cease publication. In April, 1918, after three days of deliberation, the jury failed to agree on the guilt of the men.
The second trial was held in September, 1918. John Reed, who had recently returned from Russia, was also arrested and charged with the original defendants. This time eight of the twelve jurors voted for acquittal and the defendants walked free on October 5, 1918.
Pinchot divorced his first wife and married Ruth Pickering in 1919. The couple had two children, Mary Pinchot and Antoinette Pinchot. Regular visitors to the home included Mabel Dodge, Crystal Eastman, Max Eastman, Louis Brandeis and Harold Ickes.
In 1920 two Italian immigrants, Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, were accused of murdering a shoe factory payroll clerk in Braintree, Massachusetts. Pinchot and his wife were convinced that the two men were innocent and spent a great deal of time and effort trying to get them released.
Pinchot supported his friend, Robert La Follette, the the candidate of the Progressive Party in the 1924 presidential election. Although La Follette and his running partner, Burton K. Wheeler, gained support from trade unions, the Socialist Party and the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain, La Follette only won one-sixth of the votes.
Pinchot worked for several years on two books, Big Business in America and The History of the Progressive Party. However, the books were not published in his lifetime.
Initially he supported Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal. However, he was opposed his attempt to control the Supreme Court. In April, 1937, Pinchot had a letter published in the New York Times where he criticised Roosevelt's style of government "which places the fate of labor, industry and agriculture in a bureaucracy controlled by one man... I am forced to conclude that... you desire the power of a dictator without the liability of the name."
Pinchot's daughter from his first marriage, Rosamund Pinchot, became an actress. Although she only appeared in one Hollywood movie, she did get parts in several French films. However, she suffered from depression and in 1938 she committed suicide. Pinchot was devastated and never fully recovered from this tragedy.
Pinchot retained his pacifist views and in September, 1940, helped to establish the America First Committee (AFC). The America First National Committee included Robert E. Wood, John T. Flynn and Charles A. Lindbergh. Supporters of the organization included Burton K. Wheeler, Hugh Johnson, Robert LaFollette Jr., Hamilton Fish and Gerald Nye.
The AFC soon became the most powerful isolationist group in the United States. The AFC had four main principles: (1) The United States must build an impregnable defense for America; (2) No foreign power, nor group of powers, can successfully attack a prepared America; (3) American democracy can be preserved only by keeping out of the European War; (4) "Aid short of war" weakens national defense at home and threatens to involve America in war abroad.
The AFC influenced public opinion through publications and speeches and within a year the organization had 450 local chapters and over 800,000 members. The AFC was dissolved four days after the Japanese Air Force attacked Pearl Harbor on 7th December, 1941.
Pinchot grew increasing depressed by the progress of the Second World War and in the summer of 1942 he slit his wrists. He survived this suicide attempt but his health never recovered and spent the rest of his life in hospital.
Amos Pinchot died of pneumonia in February, 1944.
Early life and education
Pinchot was born in Paris to Episcopalian parents. His father was James W. Pinchot, a successful New York City wallpaper merchant and supporter of the conservation movement and his mother was Mary Eno, daughter of one of New York City's wealthiest real estate developers, Amos Eno. His siblings were the conservation leader Gifford Pinchot, and Antoinette E. Pinchot who later married Alan Johnstone. 
Pinchot was educated at Yale where he was a member of the secret society Skull and Bones,  :88–9 He graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1897. In 1898, Pinchot enrolled at Columbia University to study law. Later that same year, he left school to fight in the Spanish–American War. Pinchot enlisted in the 1st New York Volunteer Cavalry and served in Puerto Rico. After the war ended, he enrolled in New York Law School in 1899 and was admitted to the bar association in New York in 1900.  
History of the Progressive Party 1912-1916
Pinchot, Amos R.E. Hooker, Helene Maxwell (ed.)
Published by New York University Press, 1958
Used - Hardcover
Hardcover. Condition: Fair. Dust Jacket Condition: Poor. 305 pages. Ex-library with typical marks, shelf wear, pages toned cracked front hinge but a good reading copy. The jacket has some fading and wear stains writing on front flap attached inside the covers. Theodore Roosevelt, Robert M. LaFollette, etc. Quantity Available: 1. Shipped Weight: Standard Weight. Category: American History Inventory No: 146186.
Personal life [ edit ]
On November 14, 1900, Pinchot married Gertrude Minturn at St. George's Episcopal Church in New York City. Minturn was the eldest daughter of shipping magnate Robert Bowne Minturn Jr. and his wife Sarah Susannah Minturn (née Shaw). Γ] They had two children, Rosamond and Gifford Pinchot. The couple divorced in 1918. Δ]
In August 1919, Pinchot married magazine writer Ruth Pickering. Ε] With Pickering, Pinchot would have two more children: Mary Eno (later Mary Pinchot Meyer) and Antoinette "Toni" Pinchot. Ζ]
Amos Pinchot - History
Katharine Meyer Graham owned the Washington Post newspaper. She was the daughter of Eugene Meyer, a Chairman of the “Federal” Reserve.  (Really not federal but privately owned.)
Cord Meyer was a top CIA official. His father, Cord Meyer Sr., was a diplomat and real estate developer. 
It is tempting to fathom that Katharine Meyer and Cord Meyer were related. A cursory look however shows no relation.
Cord Meyer married Mary Eno Pinchot in 1945. Mary Eno Pinchot was the daughter of Amos Pinchot. Amos Pinchot was a member of Yale’s Skull and Bones secret society.  Cord Meyer was a member of Yale’s Scroll and Key secret society. 
Mary Pinchot divorced Cord Meyer in 1958. 
Mary Pinchot, freed from Cord Meyer, embarked upon an adventurous path. She was in the high society milieu, and I do mean high. She and other high society women experimented with mind-altering drugs in the early 1960s. They got their marijuana and LSD from Timothy Leary, a professor of psychology at Harvard. 
The swinging sixties Mary Pinchot became the true love of President John F. Kennedy (JFK). She was his LSD Madonna. The two lovebirds smoked marijuana and even tried LSD. 
A book – Katharine the Great: Katharine Graham and The Washington Post (by Deborah Davis) – told about these and other shenanigans but was suppressed. The author, Deborah Davis, claimed that the source behind the Watergate scandal, popularly known as Deep Throat, was a CIA officer named Richard Ober. 
Wisenheimers might chime in now and say, “Oh come on, Ersjdamoo. We now know Deep Throat was FBI Associate Director Mark Felt.” Except the we now know crowd in fact often do not know. The deeply knowledgeable however are aware that Mark Felt was not Deep Throat.
The Gemstone Files say that Deep Throat was Katharine Meyer Graham! “Meanwhile, back at the Washington Post, Katharine Meyer ‘Deep Throat’ Graham had been feeding [Bob] Woodward and [Carl] Bernstein information for their articles.” (Gemstone 10:1) 
Deep Throat in the Ukrainegate affair is probably CIA analyst Eric Ciaramella. His “LSD Madonna” (not bringing actual LSD in this case) would have to be Ukrainian-American activist Alexandra Chalupa. 
Deep Throat II is “the whistleblower” in Ukrainegate. Tweeted President Donald Trump on November 1, 2019: “The Whistleblower must come forward to explain why his account of the phone call with the Ukrainian President was so inaccurate (fraudulent?).”
Amos Pinchot Net Worth
Amos Pinchot estimated Net Worth, Salary, Income, Cars, Lifestyles & many more details have been updated below. Let’s check, How Rich is Amos Pinchot in 2019-2020?
According to Wikipedia, Forbes, IMDb & Various Online resources, famous Celebrity Amos Pinchot’s net worth is $1-5 Million before died. Amos Pinchot earned the money being a professional Celebrity. Amos Pinchot is from United States.
Amos Pinchot’s Net Worth:
|Estimated Net Worth in 2020||$1-$3 million|
|Previous Year’s Net Worth (2019)||Under Review|
|Annual Salary||Under Review.|
|Income Source||Primary Income source Celebrity (profession).|
|Net Worth Verification Status||Not Verified|
Amos Pinchot - History
His studies were interrupted by the Spanish-American War where he served in Puerto Rico as a private in the 1st New York Volunteer Cavalry. He enlisted because he felt Spain was exploiting Cuba. His father could have easily arranged a commission as an officer, but Amos refused.
Following the war, he returned to his education and was admitted to the bar in New York in 1900. He was soon appointed a deputy assistant district attorney for New York County, but left the position a year later. Disliking the ordinary practice of law, he thereafter only took cases relevant to his personal causes.
The management of the family estates became a major responsibility. Amos was very much the successor to his father as a public spirited citizen of New York City. He, too, loved the arts, served as a trustee of the New York Philharmonic Society, and pushed for morality in government. His political associations matched those of his brother and Theodore Roosevelt, his club memberships those of his father. In his early years he devoted a considerable amount of time to charitable causes, serving as a manager of the Manhattan State Hospital for the Insane, and as a trustee of the University Settlement, the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, and the Orthopedic Hospital.
Like his father, Gifford, and Theodore Roosevelt, Amos was dedicated to reform and relief for the less fortunate but soon realized the issues at stake were deeper than charitable approaches could resolve. By 1910, he decided his efforts so far had treated only the symptoms of social illness, not the causes. That revelation converted him into one of the most zealous reformers of the 20th century.
The issue that brought him fully into political activity was the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy, the public dispute between his brother, Gifford, and the Secretary of the Interior over coal fields in Alaska. Ballinger wanted to return the lands to the public domain. Outraged, Pinchot thought that was like handing chickens to the fox, in this case big money coal interests. Of Amos's role, Gifford said:
"[He was] the man to whom I naturally turned first. He could not, of course, appear as my formal representative. Nevertheless, his advice and his help were invaluable. He was indispensable, and was especially useful in getting the facts to the public. "
The controversy became a turning point for Amos. He prepared briefs, marshaled evidence and witnesses, and kept the press glued to the issues. In true Pinchot fashion, Amos concluded that great economic interests were bent on dominating public lands, resources and political institutions to serve their own selfish ends. To him, the controversy revolved around political ethics and served to enlighten the public to the threat posed by unregulated and irresponsible wielders of financial power.
The controversy also established for Amos a number of important and enduring friendships with leading progressive politicians, including Louis D. Brandeis and Senators Jonathan P. Dolliver, Albert Beveridge, A.B. Cummins, and M.E. Clapp. But most important among his new and close friends was Senator Robert La Follette, whose liberal political philosophies and uncompromising principles were very much in accord with his own.
After 1910, Amos and Gifford helped form the progressive wing of the Republican Party, and eventually the Progressive Party. Amos was the centerpoint of what he called the party’s "radical nucleus." Theodore Roosevelt preferred to call it the "lunatic fringe." Philosophically, Gifford stood with Amos but exercised some political distancing from his brother for maneuvering purposes.
Amos and his cohorts crusaded for a complete program of social and economic reform, "the liberation of this country from special privilege and boss government," Amos said. Their politics cut across party lines, was uncompromisingly reformist and ran early into conflict with the more conservative Progressives led by Roosevelt and George Perkins. Their public battle in 1914 made Amos one of the best known names in America and helped wreck the Progressive Party.
Amos described himself as a "liberal reformer." He believed average people were kept in misery by "reckless and thoughtless commercialism," that denial of fundamental economic and social justice would eventually lead to violent revolution. His "radicalism" was in his view conservative, for he wished to preserve the political institutions of the country from revolutionary destruction:
"What I am trying, in a humble way, to help do, is to prevent violence, disorder and misery by getting people to see the justice of the average man’s demand for a better economic position in this country, and the utter futility of denying or ignoring this demand."
He campaigned for collective bargaining and the right to strike and for public ownership of strategic natural resources and what he termed "natural monopolies" like public utilities, waterpower, and transportation systems. He wished to outlaw industrial monopolies and predatory practices, and end abuses like child labor and disregard of workers' health and safety.
Amos's active work in the cause of labor and industrial reform led to his membership on the National Defense Council, organized to defend workers arrested on questionable grounds for strikes or other activities. That led to two of his principal lifelong crusades. One was civil liberties which lay at the very core of his political philosophy. He became as prominent in defending pacifists during World War I as he had been in defending workers. The threats to civil liberties he witnessed during the war account in part for his role as a founder and member of the executive committee of the American Civil Liberties Union.
Amos opposed American entry into the First World War. Although not a pacifist, and supportive of a defensive war, Amos regarded imperialistic wars as the creatures of industrial tyrants who used them to further their control over peoples and governments. He believed working people's rights to a decent living and say in government were among the first casualties of war.
Initially a supporter of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Amos soon grew suspicious of the New Deal. He feared government would replace special interests in dominating people's lives instead of abolishing such domination altogether. By the mid-1930s' he criticized the New Deal outspokenly, a position that separated him from most of his former Progressive allies, including (on these issues of political philosophy) his brother Gifford, who nonetheless joined him in supporting Roosevelt's opponents in 1936.
Amos believed the government would eventually drag the country into another world war. He focused on the antimilitarist issue in the late 1930s and prominently became one of the early writers and speakers for the America First Committee, known more generically as isolationists. He served as president of the New York chapter of the Committee. This, like so many of his other crusades, came to grief when the United States entered the war.
The author of scores of publications on the subjects of his lifelong crusades and a collector of paintings and fine furniture, Amos died at his home in New York in 1944. Despite his staunch antimilitarism, he remained proud of his own wartime service. His headstone in the family plot in the Milford Cemetery is that to which he was entitled as a veteran, and cites his service in the War with Spain.
History of the Progressive Party, 1912-1916
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1958, New Yok University Press
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Books by Amos Pinchot
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The Millionaire Reformer
It is the evening of June 20, 1912 the scene, a large room in the Congress Hotel in Chicago. About twenty men are present. Perhaps a dozen of them are seated around a large table. Others sprawl wearily in armchairs or lean against the walls. One, a solid, determined-looking fellow with thick glasses and a bristling mustache, paces grimly back and forth in silence, like a caged grizzly. He is Theodore Roosevelt, and these are his closest political advisers. All of them are very, very angry.
In a nearby auditorium, the Republican National Convention is moving with the ponderous certainty of a steamroller toward the nomination of well-fed William Howard Taft for a second term as President of the United States. All of the men in the hotel room believe that this nomination rightfully belongs to Roosevelt, and that it is being “stolen” by a cynical band of reactionary politicians who have used their control of the party machinery to seat enough illegally chosen delegates to insure the selection of their man Taft. The Roosevelt men do not want to take this lying down they would like to run their candidate on a third-party ticket. But they realize that without a great deal of money such a plan would be impossible. Frustration thus feeds and intensifies their anger.
It is growing late, and everyone is weary. Conversation lags. But gradually attention is centered on two men who have withdrawn to a corner. They are talking excitedly in rapid whispers. One is the publisher Frank Munsey the other, George W. Perkins, a former partner in J. P. Morgan & Company. Neither has had much political experience, but both are very rich and very fond of Theodore Roosevelt. Now everyone senses their subject and realizes its importance. All eyes are focused in their direction. Suddenly the two millionaires reach a decision. They straighten up and stride across the room to Roosevelt. Each places a hand on one of his shoulders. “Colonel,” they say simply, “we will see you through.” Thus the Progressive party—“Bull Moose,” some will call it—is born.
Of these two, Munsey has relatively little importance in the story of modern American reform. He was neither entirely in sympathy with Progressive aims nor even particularly interested in them. His attachment to Roosevelt was personal, and it did not last much beyond the 1912 campaign. Perkins, however, went on to become a central figure in the history of the Progressive movement.
A central figure, but not a typical one, for no single human being can be said to represent fully that multifaceted, contradictory, and disorganized mass drive for change. For example, Perkins was not, like William Jennings Bryan, the representative of disgruntled farmers frightened by loss of status and the rise of giant corporations, nor was he, like Roosevelt, an aristocrat striking out at the crass commercialism of the new industrial tycoons. Indeed, he was part of the new power elite that the Bryans, born poor, and Roosevelts, born rich, found so offensive and incomprehensible in the Progressive era. But Perkins was a businessman with a highly developed social conscience and a feeling that the times called for change if past progress was to continue in the future. This, certainly, was characteristically “Progressive.” Without accepting the arguments of the socialists, he had learned not to be afraid of government regulation or of the thought of “tampering” with the economy.
In the early years of this century many businessmen also shared this general point of view. But most confined their political activities to signing checks at campaign time few were willing or able to put aside money-making, climb up on a soapbox, and campaign among the politicians and plain people for what they thought was right. Perkins did these things. He paid a high price, and not only in money, but he did not mind he had the spirit of the crusader. This, too, was typically “Progressive.”
Nevertheless, in 1912 many people, including some of those in Roosevelt’s hotel room in Chicago, considered Perkins utterly out of place in such a gathering of advanced liberals. They knew him as the right-hand man of the hated plutocrat J. P. Morgan as a slick, smooth-talking apologist for monopolistic corporations like U.S. Steel and International Harvester as a powerful insurance executive whose “crimes” had been “exposed” by Charles Evans Hughes in the famous Armstrong insurance investigation of 1905. ∗ With his handsome, clean-cut features, his wavy brown hair only beginning to be flecked with gray at the temples, and his trim mustache, he looked too much like what in fact he had been a typical boy wonder of Wall Street. This man was many times a millionaire while scarcely forty—a driving, aggressive manager of men and money. He owned a palatial estate, Glyndor, overlooking the Hudson at Riverdale he belonged to the New York Yacht Club and other exclusive organizations. What was Perkins doing posing as a reformer, associating with a liberal like Teddy Roosevelt?
Actually, Perkins was perfectly sincere in his Progressivism. As we shall see, he did have serious personal weaknesses as a political leader, but this suspicion of his motives reflects only the confusion, jealousy, fanaticism, and small-mindedness of other Progressive reformers. Fifty years old in 1912, he had begun his career at fifteen as a $25-a-month office boy in the vast corporate anthill of the New York Life Insurance Company. Although he lacked even the beginning of a high school education, he had demonstrated powers of salesmanship and management that won him a vice-presidency at thirty.
From insurance he moved on to corporate finance. So engaging and convincing was his personality that Pierpont Morgan offered him a partnership worth millions the first time they met. As right-hand man to Morgan, Perkins supervised the organization of the Northern Securities Company (the first great corporation attacked by Roosevelt under the Sherman Antitrust Act). He wrested control of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad from the grasp of John W. “Bet-you-a-million” Gates. He represented Morgan at the White House conference where the great coal strike of 1902 was settled. He was in the thick of the fight in which Morgan stopped the Wall Street panic of 1907, and he was Morgan’s man in U.S. Steel, where for years he was chairman of the all-powerful finance committee ( see “Charlie Schwab Breaks the Bank,” and “A Lion in the Street,” AMERICAN HERITAGE, April and June, 1957).
In 1902 Perkins also created the agricultural machinery “trust,” the International Harvester Company. In a brilliant maneuver he brought the principal owners of the four leading companies manufacturing farm machinery to New York. All of these men favored a merger, but personal rivalries in the intensely competitive harvester business had frustrated all their efforts to work out an agreement. Installing each group in a different hotel to discourage them from seeing one another, Perkins scurried back and forth settling the details of the new combination. Such was the eventual confidence of all parties in his fairness that when the final critical allotment of stock in the new corporation was made, the heads of the four companies simply signed their names to this statement addressed to Perkins: “We place in your hands the final determination of our appraisal values, special good will, scaling, etc., etc.” McCormicks and Deerings held the top offices, but Perkins was the real manager of the destinies of International Harvester for many years. It was prizes like this, the not unrewarded amenities of a partnership in the House of Morgan, that Perkins gave up when he set out as a crusader for reform.
Was it really so surprising? Perkins had always possessed, or, if you will, suffered from, a “do-good” streak. His father, an insurance man also, had been a social worker deeply involved in the management of boys’ reform schools. He developed in young George an interest in the Y.M.C.A. and in various religious organizations. To the Perkins family, selling insurance had been a way of performing a useful social service as well as making a good livelihood. Later, when Morgan first offered him the prospect of great wealth if he would enter the firm, Perkins actually turned him down. Only when the banker described the opportunities that the job would offer for dealing with the complex social and economic questions posed by the rise of giant corporations did Perkins lend a sympathetic ear.
Perkins’ experience in managing large businesses gave him a special interest in labor relations. At New York Life he had developed a pension and profit-sharing program for agency directors and salesmen. This program he greatly expanded in the steel and harvester companies. Recognizing long before the idea was common that the lack of contact and understanding between worker and employer was a prime cause of bad labor relations in big corporations, he tried to interest workers in buying stock in the companies that employed them. He developed a plan for U.S. Steel whereby a worker who invested $82.50 in a share of Steel Preferred cleared $125.0 in five years—and still owned the stock. Critics on the left charged that this was a subtle way of preventing the growth of unions. Perkins rejected the unions’ basic belief that there was a fundamental conflict of interest between capital and labor, but he was not unsympathetic to organized labor. At one point he suggested that a steelworker should be on the Board of Directors it was all very advanced for the time.
The new reformer’s labors with giants like New York Life and U.S. Steel had convinced him that mere bigness in business was not a crime, as the “trust busters” were arguing, but a necessity. The savings resulting from large-scale operation, the ability to take the long-range view, to plan, to engage in expensive research —these made the large corporation efficient and hence socially desirable. Competition, the law of tooth and claw, was crude, cruel, uncivilized, Perkins believed. Antitrust laws were out of date instead of breaking up the giants, government should simply regulate their activities. Modern technology and mass markets were making older forms of business organization obsolete. Instead of competition, co-operation should be the byword of the modern world. Perkins believed that large corporations, with their thousands of stockholders, were truly “public” businesses. The function of corporate managers like himself, he said in a lecture at Columbia University in 1908, was to decide “what is fair and right between the public’s capital, which they represent, and the public’s labor, which they employ.”
Beginning early in 1911, Perkins devoted most of his time to advocating these ideas. He accepted speaking engagements all over the country and wrote unceasingly on the subject. Inevitably his crusade involved him in politics, although he had not conceived of becoming a politician when he cut loose from his business ties.
Perkins had always been a Republican. As late as 1908 he had worked actively for William Howard Taft against Bryan. But after 1910 he became increasingly dismayed by Taft’s attitude toward big business. Although the President allied himself generally with the conservatives, he was a confirmed trust buster. “We must get back to competition,” he said. “If it is impossible, then let us go on to socialism, for there is no way between.” Perkins was convinced that there was a “way between”: regulation of large corporations by the federal government. When Taft ordered antitrust suits against both U.S. Steel and International Harvester, Perkins went definitely into the opposition. Like most liberal Republicans, he thought Roosevelt the most attractive alternative.
Despite his lack of political experience, Perkins became chairman of the new Progressive or “Bull Moose” party’s executive committee. In effect he was Roosevelt’s campaign manager, and he tried to run the campaign the way an insurance man conducts a drive for new business. To him, voters were like the policy-holders and “prospects” of the insurance world. One of the Progressive party’s great handicaps was that it had only “prospects” at the moment, and so a great sales campaign commenced.
Directing the fight from New York headquarters, Perkins was soon flooding the mails with torrents of campaign literature. Three million copies of Roosevelt’s “Confession of Faith” were distributed. Countless other pamphlets followed. Perkins established a weekly magazine called the Progressive Bulletin , copied from a bulletin he had edited for years while working for New York Life. Like its prototype, it was full of slogans designed to inspire confidence in the faithful, along with “up-to-date, sledge-hammer arguments” to convince the doubtful. “What are you doing to help the Progressive party? Are you telling our story to every man and woman you meet?” Under Perkins the political “hard sell” reached a new peak.
It made for an exciting and hard-fought, if inevitably unsuccessful, effort. The fundamental fact of 1912 was that the Republicans had split while the Democrats remained united. Had the Democrats nominated a conservative like Champ Clark of Missouri, who almost won out at their convention, Roosevelt might have been elected, for 1912 marked the highwater mark of the Progressive wave. But with Woodrow Wilson in the fight, fresh from his triumphs as Governor of New Jersey, Progressives could choose between two appealing candidates. Wilson collected his full share of their votes, and together with the solid South and the “regular” Democrats of the North, this made an unbeatable combination.
The Bull Moosers were far from discouraged, however. Roosevelt ran a strong second, winning over 4,126,020 votes (to Wilson’s 6,296,547) and carrying six states, including California, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. He overwhelmed Taft, despite all the President’s advantages, so that the ample champion of the orthodoxy won only 3,486,720, or eight electoral votes. ** The future looked bright. “Progressive seed has been sewn on such a large area of soil that a pretty fair crop is bound to be the result ere long,” Perkins announced after the election.
But there was much to learn about politics, Perkins had discovered. Selling a candidate was not like hawking insurance. Some of the personal qualities that had made him a brilliant businessman proved only weaknesses when applied to politics. He found it impossible to subordinate himself to a team effort. The Bulletin had been his idea, and a good one, but he had made it far too much a vehicle for his views rather than for general Progressive policies and opinions. The first issue contained a full-page reprint of an editorial in the New York Journal praising his organizing ability. Two weeks later there was a long account of a petty argument between Perkins and Woodrow Wilson over the difference between Tammany Society and Tammany Hall. Two issues later came a lead article by Perkins on Wilson and the trust question.
It was natural enough for the Bulletin to stress the trust issue it was central to Perkins’ beliefs, and by 1912 Roosevelt was substantially in accord with Perkins’ idea that government regulation was the proper way to deal with giant corporations. But Perkins erred deeply when he allowed the Bulletin to devote such a disproportionate amount of space to the question and to print his name as often as it did. His aggressiveness irritated many loyal Progressives. The conservation expert Gifford Pinchot, for example, dubbed him “Gabby George,” and another supporter of T.R. claimed that the entire New York organization of the party “consisted of George W. Perkins and a push button.” Such criticism came as a profound shock to the political neophyte.
Another lesson that Perkins had to learn during the campaign was that the rough and tumble of politics is not for the tender-skinned. He had given up all his profitable business connections—his partnership in the Morgan firm alone was probably worth a million dollars a year—in order to work for public betterment. He believed utterly in the soundness of his crusade against the Sherman Antitrust Act certainly no one should question his motives, he thought. He had remained active in U.S. Steel and in International Harvester not to make money, for he drew no salary from either company, but because he felt that “these organizations are right from the viewpoint of modern ethics, just as I am sure they are necessary from the viewpoint of modern economics.” Yet now he found himself assailed as an unscrupulous and selfish capitalist seeking to use the government to benefit his pet monopolies.
Scarcely had Roosevelt been nominated by the Progressives when a Democratic congressman began to call Perkins “the chief intermediary” between big business and the Justice Department, the “minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary” of the Morgan interests. Even Woodrow Wilson, who did not stoop to mudslinging, was unusually forthright in attacking Perkins and his views. “These gentlemen say that these big combinations are necessary for economy and efficiency,” Wilson said in one speech. “The only answer I can think of that meets the suggestion is: Rats! Go tell all that to the Marines.”
Perkins was naturally angered by these criticisms, most of which questioned not only his beliefs but also his motives. It was particularly exasperating to be called a tool of the House of Morgan when in fact J. P. Morgan, Jr., was trying to force him off the Board of Directors of U.S. Steel! Morgan thought Perkins’ political activities “controversial” and likely to injure the corporation. Many other business leaders, of course, were horrified by Perkins’ views on government regulation of business, which they considered socialistic.
Perkins did not resign from U.S. Steel, then or later, nor did he alter his basic beliefs. Nevertheless, when the campaign was over he changed his political techniques considerably in the light of his 1912 experiences. He made an effort to conciliate Progressives, like Gifford and Amos Pinchot, who had criticized his leadership. In part the objections of these men had been ideological, for they were ardent advocates of trust busting. (Amos Pinchot once tried to write a book exposing the sins of U.S. Steel.) The party structure was revamped and critics of Perkins given important places in it. The Bulletin was transferred to other hands, both the trust question and Perkins’ name disappearing from its pages. A Progressive Service, to provide economic and sociological information useful in drafting legislation, was established.
Nevertheless, even his co-workers found it hard to accept Perkins’ leadership. Prejudices rising from his former business connections would not die down. “Perkins stands for nothing but rights of property,” a disgruntled Progressive from South Dakota complained. Nor could Perkins completely suppress what William Allen White called his “seven-devil lust to grab the drum and get up around to the head of the procession.” The business world had taught him to act decisively, but not how to give others a sense of participation.
It is extremely significant that, in Perkins, leadership looked more and more like dictatorship. Roosevelt started a third party because he felt that a small clique of professionals had stolen control of the G.O.P. Yet from start to finish, the Progressive organization itself was managed by a tiny inner circle. In the summer of 1912, delegates to the first Progressive convention were hand-picked by local caucuses in the traditional smoke-filled rooms at the climactic 1916 convention, Perkins and a few other leaders intrigued for days to prevent the delegates from nominating Roosevelt before the Republican convention had committed itself, although nearly every soul among them desired to do so at once. It was the methods, not the program, that soured the rank and file.
Of course there were other reasons why Roosevelt’s Bull Moose organization did not fulfill the high hopes of 1912 in succeeding years. Wilson’s New Freedom undermined the Progressive appeal by putting many of its proposals into effect. And the party lacked the patronage, prestige, and organization at the grass roots to sustain itself while out of power. Its one matchless asset was Roosevelt, yet after the outbreak of the European war the old Rough Rider rapidly lost interest in domestic affairs. First enthusiasm faded, then hope. By 1916 many Progressives were ready to go back to the Republicans on almost any terms. One of Perkins’ strengths was his continuing willingness to contribute time and money to the cause when others drifted away.
The story of the efforts of Progressive and Republican leaders to agree upon a common candidate in 1916 has already been told in these pages ( see “T.R. on the Telephone,” AMERICAN HERITAGE, December, 1957). Perkins arranged for the then-novel private telephone that connected the politicians in Chicago with Roosevelt in Oyster Bay, and paid the bill. But his main role was to keep the Progressives quiet until the Republicans could be persuaded to accept the apostate Roosevelt as their candidate. When compromise efforts failed, and when Roosevelt decided to support the Republican nominee, Charles Evans Hughes, Perkins went along with him reluctantly personally he had little use for Hughes.
The Progressives now disappeared as a party, and Roosevelt, the leader, devoted himself chiefly to assailing Wilson’s foreign policy. Perkins, on the other hand, was determined to keep fighting for the Progressive program within the Republican ranks. He persuaded Hughes to include six former Progressives—including himself—on the Republican campaign committee. Later, after Hughes’ narrow defeat of 1916, when the Old Guard seized control of the Republican Executive Committee, Perkins tried to organize a liberal revolt, an effort cut short by U.S. entry into the European war. The following year Perkins led the battle that resulted in the election of Will Hays, who was friendly to the former Progressives, as Republican National Chairman. It was in no small part because of Perkins that the Old Guard faction was held in check until the 1920 election. By that time Perkins was no longer alive to fight.
Unlike so many amateur politicians, Perkins was willing to work as hard on local and state questions as on “important” national problems. The 1915 revision of the New York State constitution (which he opposed) and the wartime New York City Food Committee (which he managed) are examples of his activities on these levels. In 1914 he traveled all the way to the Panama Canal Zone simply to try to persuade Colonel George W. Goethals, the engineer in charge of constructing the canal, to accept appointment as New York City Police Commissioner. Goethals did not come.
Perkins’ governing principle, in local and national politics and in business too, was that the people, if given a chance to understand fully, would always do whatever was right. This faith in democracy was typically “Progressive”—Bryan, it will be recalled, possessed it so utterly that he assumed automatically that the truth could be determined by counting noses. What distinguished Perkins’ faith in the people was his willingness to invest vast amounts of his own money in seeing that the public was fully informed. When he was battling for stricter food and price controls during the war, he spent thousands spreading his views.
His dedication to Jefferson’s great principle that the truth, if left to itself, would always prevail, was proved conclusively by an incident that occurred during the fight. He was challenged by Samuel Fraser of the New York Federation of Farm Bureaus. Perkins, Fraser said, was making unfair use of his wealth by flooding the state with huge advertisements which his opponent could not afford to match. Without a moment’s hesitation, Perkins offered to buy space in every paper in the state so that Fraser could present his arguments to the people. On September 27, 1917, Fraser’s indictment of Perkins was spread across the pages of 141 New York newspapers, at a cost to Perkins of $25,000.
This use of widespread advertising for political purposes was a new thing. Perkins, the trade paper Editor and Publisher commented in 1915, had “uncovered the 42-centimeter gun that from now on must be considered the master of the situation when it comes to carrying the redoubts of public opinion.” In all his political activities, as earlier in business, he was noted for boldness, imagination, and a willingness to use new and unconventional methods. When battling to keep down New York food prices in 1917, he discovered that there was a great run of smelts on the Pacific coast and bought over 100,000 pounds at four cents a pound. These he shipped to New York and sold to retailers at four and a half cents, on condition that they sell them to the public for not more than six. At that moment, Atlantic coast smelts were selling at about eighteen cents a pound.
The Great War affected Perkins profoundly, although not really until it was all over. Like any public-spirited citizen he worked hard during the conflict—at his Food Committee job and in raising money for the Y.M.C.A. But two events in late 1918 hit him with staggering force. One was the death of his son’s young wife in the flu epidemic. The other was an investigation he made of Y.M.C.A. activities overseas right after the Armistice. His experiences in France and Germany broadened and tempered his Progressivism. When first he saw the devastated areas of France he had seethed with rage against the Germans. But anger and revenge were futile in the face of so much misery and destruction.
When he stepped off the boat on his return to America, he told reporters that economic reconstruction seemed far more urgent than political. They asked him about the menace of Russian communism, and he said: “I don’t know what to say about Bolshevism in Europe. There are deep-seated troubles there. In Paris … people are paying $1 apiece for apples, and $3 a pound for butter.” When asked if, by feeding Russians and Germans, the Allies were not “nursing a viper in the breast,” he replied: “How are we going to cut out any one group of people?”
Realizing that the world was at a great turning point, Perkins searched hard for the path that “the man of the future” should take through the morass of postwar readjustment. There was much labor unrest a bitter strike was convulsing the steel industry and angry radicals were talking of sweeping changes in the order of things. “The questions that took me out of the banking business,” Perkins wrote his old friend Albert J. Beveridge, “are now coming to a head.” In December, 1919, in a lecture at Columbia University, he argued that the politicians of the future must “so frame our laws as to permit co-operative effort … conducted under proper regulation and control.”
Where national politics was concerned, Perkins was moved by the same vague and somewhat authoritarian desire to get at fundamentals and by a conviction that intense partisanship was out of place in modern society. When one politician suggested to him that the trend was running so strongly toward the Republicans that they could elect a “yellow dog” President in 1920, he replied by asking him icily “what use … a yellow dog would be to our country and the world at large in the handling of the momentous questions presenting themselves at this time.” And he lectured Senator Reed Smoot of Utah about the importance of “constructive thought” and the futility of “hot-air speeches.”
Such words had little effect on Smoot and the other leaders of the Republican party, who were then not at all interested in Perkins’ ideas about “proper regulation and control” of the economy. They gave the country Warren G. Harding and “normalcy.” But Perkins did not live to see what followed, for his health failed rapidly in the spring of 1920, and in June he died, victim of acute encephalitis complicated by a heart condition.
George Perkins had brains, money, enthusiasm, self confidence, and faith in the cause of reform. Even his enemies acknowledged his winning nature, his sincerity, his vivacity. “Anyone who knows him cannot help liking him,” his relentless foe Amos Pinchot confessed. Why then did he fail at reform? In part, the prejudices of lesser men undid him: they called him a tool of the “interests.” “If I had built a hospital “ or endowed a library with the money I spent,” he told one critic toward the end of his career, “many people would have risen up and called me blessed. I prefer to spend what money I am able in advancing measures that I believe are thoroughly in the public interest, and I intend to pursue this course.”
But Perkins was also partially responsible for his own failure. He was too headstrong to be successful in politics. His decisiveness and his dedication often led him to ignore others. When called to account, he liked to reply that every business must have a single head, and he could cite examples from his experience in industry to prove his point. The real nature of political democracy still escaped him: this was the paradox of Perkins’ life. He believed that progress depended upon men learning to work together, but he could not work in harness with others at the task of making a better world.
* The charges were later dismissed in a federal court after the politicking was over.
** In this election, the Socialist Eugene V. Debs received about 900,000 votes, the highest percentage of the total vote that party ever won.
Amos Pinchot to Theodore Roosevelt, December 3, 1912
I want to write you apropos of our conversation about Perkins last Friday, because I feel that I can express myself more clearly in writing. If you care to show this letter to Perkins, I shall be glad to have you do so, as I know he will understand the spirit in which it is written, and as I do not want to say anything about him which I would not say to him.
In my opinion, it would be a serious, if not fatal, error to have him remain in the position of titular head of our party. And I firmly believe that if the facts are presented to Perkins, he will see this as plainly as many of us do and be the first in urging that he should withdraw from the Chairmanship of the Executive Committee.
I do not like to burden you, Colonel, with my anxieties. I know the burden you already carry in leading a great movement, in keeping us all together, and in planning for the future, is more than any man, however strong, should be asked to bear. But in this Progressive Party, with its thousands of earnest men and women giving their strength to the cause of humanity, and with the millions of struggling people who see some hope in a cause dedicated to economic justice instead of to politics, we have something so fine and so full of possibilities of real usefulness to our [page 2] country, that I feel justified in laying before you what seems to me so fearfully plain.
From the beginning of the organization of the Progressive Party, we have set a high standard and made the claim that we are going to something a little different and better than the old parties. We have frankly stated that we are not out for political victory only, but to establish social and economic justice. As Lincoln freed the chattel slave, so are we going to free the industrial slave. We have gone into battle singing hymns and announcing that we will stand at Armageddon and battle for the Lord. From the very beginning, we have framed our campaign rather as a crusade than as a political fight. In short, we have assumed a heavy responsibility toward the people and placed ourselves on a plane where any suspicion of insincerity would be utterly ruinous to the cause.
We speak more specifically, we are today solemnly pledged to carry on an active campaign against the system of exploitation which the trusts have fastened upon the American people. It is the same old struggle for economic justice which has gone on from the beginning of time, -- the few who are strong and rich and organized against the many who are poor, weak and unorganized. In the old days it was the Crown and the privileged group surrounding the Crown against the people. Today it is the industrial oligarchy, the trusts, against the people.
We have outlined a magnificent program. In the first place, we plan to have real popular government, and in the second place, we have [page 3] announced a campaign of social and industrial justice. Under the latter head we advocate decent hours of labor, minimum wage, industrial insurance, old age pension, safety devices, employers' liability, etc. All of these things will, we hope, make the lives of wage earners during their hours of labor safe and healthy. They will make our factories a better place to work in, labor safer, and old age more endurable. But all these reforms when established will be costly, and will make the production of the necessaries of life more expensive. If we put every one of these measures into practice, and do not at the same time prevent the trusts from simply shifting the burden of the additional cost of production on the to the shoulders of the people, as they have frequently done in the past, we will accomplish little or nothing. It will be as hard as ever for the average man and woman to pay for food, clothing or fuel. The wage-earner, though perhaps working under better conditions in the factories, will be as near starvation as ever in the home. We will help the consumer not at all. The trusts will continue to make a killing out of selling the sheer necessities of life at prices that they can ill afford to pay, and our whole program of social and industrial justice will be open to the criticism of woeful incompleteness, if not of insincerity.
We have got to meet this trust question frankly and immediately. It is the cost of living question, -- the bread question. If we weaken or falter in regard to it, our party will fail.
We cannot keep the people's confidence or support by preaching mere [page 4] palliatives. We have got to stand for something different and more fundamental than the old parties have stood for, or quit claiming that our cause is the cause of humanity and justice.
All of this is what you have seen and taught people to see. And each day they are seeing and feeling it more intensely. There is but one great issue in America, and that is the economic issue whether our industrial system shall serve or exploit the people.
The Republican Party has just crashed to the ground because it stood with the corporations instead of against them in this struggle.
The Democratic Party has just won a sweeping victory because the people hoped that it would fight the corporations instead of protect them. Nothing that Wilson did in his campaign gave him the confidence of the people to such an extent as his telegram in reply to Bryan's question whether he would stand for the election of Judge Parker, a corporation man, as temporary Chairman of the Democratic Convention.
We may have a party as highly organized as Perkins and Munsey's money and Perkin's great business ability can make it, -- perhaps as highly organized and perfectly [coordinated] as the G.O.P. itself. But unless we keep the great issue clear -- unless we make plain beyond a suspicion our stand on the great economic question, whether the trusts shall or shall not be allowed to exploit the people by dictating the terms upon which the people shall obtain food, fuel and clothing, we will lack a cause and our party will be a flash in the pan. I believe that under the circumstances the selection of a trust magnate as leader (titular or otherwise) of our [page 5] party would be bad politics and bad ethics. Mr. Perkins has been a director of the Steel and Harvester trusts. These two particular corporations are the ones whose unsocial and monopolistic practices have been most thoroughly exposed in the magazines, in the daily press, in the publications of the Survey and of the Sage Foundation, and in the investigations of two Congressional Committees. The Executive Committee of the Steel Trust of which Mr. Perkins I believe has been Chairman, has openly, and I think indefensibly been instrumental in stamping out labor unionism from the steel corporation. I understand that more or less of the same thing has gone on in the Harvester Trust. The record of both trusts in regard to their treatment of employees is public property today.
Since Mr. Perkins has been Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Progressive Party, he has been more active than any one man in any party in the defense of big business. His signed columns in the daily papers have been largely pleas in behalf of big business and [attempts] to show that big business is after all the people's best friend. He was quoted (I do not know whether accurately or not) in a public statement as advocating that the Industrial Commission called for in our platform should be made up of men like Mr. James J. Hill. He has shown bad judgement by attacking Bryan in the state of Colorado, by making himself and the justification of big business an issue everywhere, by circulating two pamphlets entitled, "Is Perkins Honest," and "Is Perkins Sincere?" And by offering to become our party's expositor of the trust question in a series of signed articles on Collier's, answering Brandeis. His unceasing [page 6] activity and his large contributions, together with Munsey's contribution, have given the impression that our party has fallen under trusts' and Wall Street influences in short, that Munsey and Perkins hold a kind of mortgage on the Progressive cause.
I realize that we should be and are most grateful for Perkins's tremendous generosity and hard effective organizing work. Any one that knows him cannot help liking him and admiring his energy, perseverance, and ceaseless industry. Personally, I believe that Perkins will not demand a controlling position in the party as a condition of remaining in it and working with it. I cannot believe that he, or any man who really cares for the Progressive Cause, would require a fifty-one percent. interest in the party, or refuse to take any interest at all.
Nothing that Perkins has done or said has suggested that he was not strictly on the level and acting conscientiously and in accordance with his deepest convictions. Nothing that we could give Perkins or do for him would be too great a reward for his hard work and financial support. But Perkins, like the rest of us, must be governed in this crisis by only one thing, -- the good of the party and the Progressive movement. It will be hard for him to relinquish a controlling position in the party, but hard things happen to all of the Progressive leaders. It was hard for you to go into this terrible [grueling] fight with the almost certain knowledge that you would be defeated, and hard for you to have been shot in the body at the end of it by a would-be assassin. It has been hard for Ben Lindsey to make his fight against the Evans-Guggenheim crowd hard for Heney and [page 7] Johnson in their struggle hard for Gifford wearing himself out in fifteen years of incessant effort for the cause of the people. But no man, whatever his services, can deserve anything from the party which will endanger the party's welfare or even its existence.
What I have mentioned above seems to me to contain serious objections to Perkins's leadership in the Progressive Party. I think he will see that himself if he is talked to plainly about it. But there is one matter in comparison with which I feel all others are minor considerations. Unless I am much mistaken, the episode of the elimination of the anti-trust plank from the Progressive platform is bound to come out, either at Chicago or subsequently. McCarthy's interview has started people talking, and anyhow, practically all of the Resolutions Committee are probably familiar with the facts.
If Perkins remains in a position of control it will be said that our party has chosen as its leader the man who went to Chicago and succeeded in having cut from our contract with the people the one clause which bound us to fight the trusts and protect the people. It will be said that he not only fought the anti-trust clause and succeeded in having it eliminated after the Committee on Resolutions had adopted it on the night before the platform was read, but that when the Committee put it back again and repassed it, and after he himself next day heard it read to the Convention and formally adopted, and after it had thus become actually and legally part and parcel of our platform, he was instrumental in once more having it out in defiance of the Convention's action.
In addition to this, it will be pointed out that, although our Convention [page 8] adopted the anti-trust clause and made it a part of our platform, and although you yourself were in favor of the plank and in essence embodied it in your speech to the Convention (and Perkins knew this to be the case, for he heard the plank read to the Convention by Dean Lewis, and he was familiar with your Convention speech), he caused to be printed and spread broadcast throughout the country a false version of the platform intentionally omitting the anti-trust clause.
We know what the result of this was. We were placed in a false and fatal position in regard to the whole trust question, and especially in regard to monopoly. Our sincerity was questioned. The Democrats scored upon us heavily. And in spite of the fact that your own position was right, and that our real platform was right, we could not justify our shortcomings and were obliged to spend every ounce of our energy in defending ourselves and explaining to the people that we stood for something which our contract with the people omitted, and that we were really not opposed to the prosecution of monopolistic and unsocial combinations.
On the whole, we came out of the trust controversy with only fair credit. What the result would have been if the facts of [Perkins's] fight against the anti-trust plank had come out during the campaign it is hard to say. But it is probable that there would have been an immediate crisis if it had become known that the omission of any reference to the anti-trust in our platform was not through inadvertence that an anti-trust in our platform was not through inadvertence that an anti-trust plank had been adopted by the delegates to the Convention, but cut at the instance of a director of the Steel and Harvester trusts., [page 9]
I believe that Perkins will see all of this as clearly as we do. I believe that he will see that the great essential in the Progressive Party is to keep our people together and develop an undivided, effective fighting force, united in personnel, but above all united in principles and policy. I believe that he will see that the probability of being able to do this is practically nil as long as the cause is led by a man who differs so radically with the majority of the party upon a fundamental question of policy, and who doesn't command the confidence (I do not mean personal confidence, but confidence in regard to the trust questions) of the rank and file and of the majority of the leaders of our party.
If the fight against Perkins on the ground that he unjustifiably emasculated our platform in the interest of big business is not made at Chicago next week, we are in serious danger of it being made at some time, for his leadership, unwelcome as it will be to a large element of the party, will surely result in discord, and this discord may at any time develop into an attack upon him on the grounds I have stated. We cannot stand such an attack and Perkins himself is the only man who can save us from it by doing the fine thing which I think he is willing to do, and putting us in a position where our cause will not have the sword of Damocles hanging forever over us.
In order to succeed as a party we must have a program representing an actual economic need of the people. This actual economic need of the people is today what is has always been since history's beginning, -- freedom from industrial exploitation at the hands of special privilege. [page 10] The only difference is that today, owing to the educational work which has been going on in this country since your first administration, the people know exactly what is the matter and are fully determined that something shall be done about it.
For us to go into this fight unnecessarily handicapped, weakened, and threatened by the leadership of a man whose record even up to and since the Chicago Conventions shows him to be unsympathetic to the cause as understood by the majority of the people, seems to me to be in first place unjust to the cause upon purely ethical grounds, and in the second place, to be political folly. No amount of financial support or organizing ability can for an instant counterbalance the loss of respect and the blow to the sincerity of our aims such an arrangement would result in.
You said to me the other day that it was folly to propose that Perkins should resign as Chairman of the Executive Committee until we had found someone else to take his place. It seems to me that it would be better to even leave the office vacant for a while than to have him continue in it. But there must be men who could fill this position effectively, [although] not with quite the same degree of brilliancy or ability. Bristow, Chester Rowell, Merriam, Herbert K. Smith, William Allen White occur to one's mind and there must be several other men who could be called on and made to feel the obligation to serve.
It is the fundamental question whether we will start right or wrong, whether we will have such support as is accorded to parties or men who are known to be sincere and right-thinking. [page 11]
If we believe that the mission of our party and the business of our generation in America is to destroy privilege and fight an oppressive industrial system which makes the lives of men, women, and children harder than they should be, we must draw the issue clearly and simply, and leave no place for doubts of our singleness of purpose.
If our party should fail now it would be a public calamity. It would seem to mean a humiliating defeat of those forces in America which are represented not only by patriotic politicians, but by the splendid list of social workers, educators, etc., who have found a home for their efforts and aspirations within the party.
If Perkins want to take a position of leadership in the party, let him first identify himself with progressive social and industrial work, so that in the mind of the public he will be something besides a trust magnate -- so that his name will bring to mind other organizations than the New York Life Insurance Company, J. P. Morgan & Co., the United States Steel Corporation, and the International Harvester Company. He could easily take a position of leadership in industrial work in this state and in the nation if he feels as we feel about these questions. He has in the highest degree the ability, the attractive personality and the energy necessary for such leadership. There is plenty for him or any man in his position to do. Let him clean up the unfortunate conditions of labor in the Harvester Trust. Let him make a fight in the Steel Corporation in favor of labor unionism and against the terrible system of industrial oppression that the Sage Foundation publications so vividly portray. Then he can assume leadership in the Progressive Party, with the confidence of the people and with [page 12] a record which affirms rather than denies the propositions for which our party stands.